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Abstract 
Over the past decades, private R&D spending in the US and other developed countries has 
been growing faster than GDP. At the same time, the growth rates of per capita and aggregate 
output have been rather stable, possibly declining slightly.  
This paper proposes a growth model that can account for the observed phenomenon by 
explicitly describing competition among technological leaders and followers in individual 
markets in a way that is consistent with existing studies on firms’ motivation to invest in 
R&D. The model shows the possibility that the unsustainable trend of rising R&D intensity 
persists for a very long time.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
It has been observed that for at least the past sixty years, US growth rates have been 
remarkably stable while R&D efforts seem to have been growing much faster than GDP. 
Figure 1 shows the growth rate of US per capita GDP and the ratio of non-federal R&D 
expenditure to GDP, henceforth referred to as R&D intensity, since the 1950s. It is evident 
that while the former has no apparent trend, the latter has increased substantially from 0.63% 
in 1953 to 1.95% in 2007, i.e. by more than a factor of three. Different authors have looked at 
other measures of R&D intensity, most frequently numbers of R&D scientists and engineers 
as a share of the labour force1, but the same basic picture emerges. Moreover, while data for 
other developed countries are not available as far back as for the US, the recent trends 
observed elsewhere are similar. While Figure 2 replicates the well-known trends of R&D 
employment in the G5 documented by Jones (1995a) , Figure 3 shows that the since the early 
1980s, R&D intensity in the G7 countries, which accounted for over 80% of worldwide R&D 
in 2004, 2 has also been growing on average.  
The implications of rising R&D intensity can only be fully appreciated if its causes are 
known and understood. In particular, as the current trend of fast growing R&D efforts must 
eventually come to an end, it would be important to be able to make predictions about when 
the current trend will be reversed, how this will happen, what the new growth path will look 
like and whether there will be a slow transition or an abrupt change. 
This paper shows how a standard model of semi-endogenous growth due to R&D 
investment can be modified to account for these empirical patterns. The central idea is that 
incumbent firms protect their competitive position by innovating at a rate that is high enough 
to prevent market entry by competitors. R&D investment is therefore determined by the 
                                                
1 See for example Jones (1995b) or Kortum (1997) . 
2 National Science Board (2008) , Chapter 4, p 4-35.  
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competitive conditions in individual markets, in particular the ease of entry, rather than 
expected future profits. This means that, in contrast to many of the workhorse models in 
growth theory, there is no a priori reason why R&D expenditure should grow at the same rate 
as GDP, at least as long as its share in firms’ cost is low. The main contribution of this paper 
is to show a simple way in which rising R&D intensity can be explained as an endogenous 
model feature, and how the observation of almost constant growth rates in excess of what 
would be possible on the balanced growth path (BGP) can persist for such a long time. Our 
model emphasizes the difference between the growth rate of innovation and imitation costs as 
the driving factor behind growing R&D intensity. This difference can be calibrated using 
existing data and used to project the transition of the current high-growth economy to a low-
growth balanced growth path.  
 
Figure 1: US per-capita growth and Intensity of non-federally funded R&D 
 
Notes: per-capita GDP growth: five-year averages; data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
R&D intensity: ratio of non-federally funded R&D expenditure to GDP; data source: National Science 
Foundation. 
 
0	  0.5	  
1	  1.5	  
2	  2.5	  
3	  3.5	  
4	  4.5	  
5	  
1953	   1955	   1957	   1959	   1961	   1963	   1965	   1967	   1969	   1971	   1973	   1975	   1977	   1979	   1981	   1983	   1985	   1987	   1989	   1991	   1993	   1995	   1997	   1999	   2001	   2003	   2005	  
[p
er
ce
n
t]
	  
per-­‐capita	  GDP	  growth	   R&D	  intensity	  (nonfed)	  
 4 
The paper is organized as follows. The following section briefly reviews the previous 
literature on the subject. Section 3 starts out by arguing that existing endogenous growth 
models are not well suited to explaining rising R&D intensities and discusses alternative 
motives to innovate that have not received much attention in the theoretical literature on 
economic growth. Section 4 describes a conceptually simple modification of existing 
standard growth models that can not only make them consistent with the data, but also bring 
them better in line with existing micro evidence on the effectiveness of the patent system. 
The model is calibrated and simulated in section 5, and its predictions about the future of 
economic growth are discussed, including the inevitable transition to a different growth path. 
Some brief remarks on welfare and policy implications are made in section 6. The last 
discusses possible extensions of the model and concludes. 
 
Figure 2: R&D employment as share of 
labour force in the G5 
 
Notes: Scientists and engineers in R&D as share of 
civilian labour force. Source: Jones (2002) . The 
employment data is available online at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~chadj/upslow1.asc; labour 
force data from OECD and BLS. 
 
Figure 3: Growth rate of R&D intensity in 
the G7 
 
Notes: Average change in R&D intensity over 
previous year, weighted by GDP. Data sources: 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US: Eurostat 
(R&D in business and enterprise sector), Canada: 
OECD (Manufacturing sector only); growth rate 
excludes Canada before 1988, Germany before 
1992. Average growth for time span shown: 0.9%. 
 
2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Several papers have studied specific implications of rising R&D intensity. Jones (1995a) has 
argued that rising R&D efforts and constant growth rates are inconsistent with many of the 
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models of endogenous growth developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as these models 
exhibit scale effects in R&D, i.e. rising R&D leads to rising growth rates. He advocates 
models of “semi-endogenous” growth, which avoid these problems. 
Segerstrom (1998) and Kortum (1997) investigate how the apparently inconsistent 
observations of rising R&D employment and stable patent creation rates can be reconciled. 
Both articles conclude that it must be becoming increasingly hard to innovate as 
technological knowledge increases. However, neither paper addresses the question why R&D 
employment is rising faster than the labour force. Solving his model only for a growth path 
along which R&D intensity is constant, Segerstrom (1998)  conjectures that the 
disequilibrium dynamics that lead to a rising R&D intensity could be a consequence of 
increasing subsidies or growing market size. 
Jones (2002) explores how the fact that R&D intensity is increasing affects our 
assessment of the scope for sustained growth in the long term. Since this variable cannot 
continue to rise at the current rate forever – R&D expenditure is bounded above by GDP – at 
some point in the future the growth of R&D intensity must slow down and eventually stop. In 
models where semi-endogenous growth results from R&D efforts, this reduction of R&D 
growth leads to a drop of the overall growth rate. Only after R&D intensity and other 
variables that currently grow at an unsustainably high rate have stabilized can the economy 
be on a balanced growth path. 
In a growth accounting exercise, the author attributes more than 50% of the post-war US 
per-capita growth to the effects of rising R&D intensity and another about 30% to a different 
transitory effect, the increase in educational attainment. Only the remaining 20%, 
corresponding to an annual per-capita growth rate of 0.4%, can persist in the long term when 
the economy is on a balanced growth path.3 
                                                
3 Ibid., p. 228, table 2, ! = 0.333  case. 
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To describe the present situation in which stocks and flows grow at constant but possibly 
unsustainable rates resulting in a constant rate of output growth, Jones (2002) introduces the 
concept of a constant growth path. If the constant growth path cannot be followed forever, at 
some point the growth rates of certain variables will have to adjust, and the economy may 
eventually converge to a balanced growth path. 
While the apparent tension between a constant growth rate and rising R&D intensity has 
been investigated in a number of papers, typically with the intention to make a specific point 
as in the articles mentioned above or to falsify existing concepts as in Jones (1995b) , 
relatively little effort has been made to understand the causes of growing R&D intensity and 
to explain why the US economy has embarked on a growth path that appears to be driven by 
transition dynamics while at the same time showing no sign of convergence towards what 
could be considered a more sustainable balanced growth path.4 The main objective of this 
paper is to present a model that explains not just how a transition from a high-growth to a 
low-growth scenario takes place, but also explains why the US economy has experienced 
rising R&D intensities. 
One paper that has addressed this issue Pintea and Thompson (2007) . These authors 
construct a model that can explain how rising educational attainment and rising R&D 
intensity can coincide with falling growth rates. They argue that a one-time increase of the 
                                                
4 One possible explanation is the increasing economic integration of the US and other OECD countries with the 
rest of the world, resulting in rapid market growth. While probably being a relevant aspect of the explanation, 
this is unlikely to be quantitatively the most important one. To see why, consider the following simple 
calculation. According to IMF data, the G7 countries accounted for about 55% of world GDP in 2007. If in the 
1950s the G7 countries had made up the whole world market, and today they were perfectly integrated with the 
remaining 45% of the world, and if all the world’s R&D were performed in the G7 countries, this would explain 
an increase of R&D intensity by 82%. This is far less than the actual rise of US R&D intensity by 210% from 
1953 to 2007. 
 7 
difficulty to innovate, following a drop in the effectiveness of learning-by-doing, has 
triggered innovative monopolists to attempt to raise R&D employment. The resulting 
increase in demand for skilled labour resulted in higher skill premium and – as a supply 
response – higher educational attainment. At the same time, growth rates declined as a result 
of the adverse change in the environment affects an increasing number of firms. While 
producing dynamics that resemble US post-war developments in R&D intensity and 
productivity growth, these outcomes critically rely on a distinct specification of the 
knowledge production function, which triggers profit-maximizing firms to increase R&D 
spending in response to a drop in its effectiveness. In contrast to Jones (2002) , Pintea and 
Thompson do predict a reduction of the growth rate once the rise in R&D intensity comes to 
an end; according to their model, the growth rate has already been dropping, possibly 
overshooting, as the US economy is making the transition to a new balanced growth path, 
characterized by a somewhat lower per-capita growth rate. 
3 MOTIVES TO INVEST IN R&D 
The models of R&D and growth most frequently employed in the literature are descendants 
of two distinct but related approaches, Romer's (1990) model of an expanding variety of 
goods and the framework introduced by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and 
Howitt (1992) known as the quality ladder or Schumpeterian model. While differing in 
several important ways, both frameworks rely on an R&D sector as the source of innovation 
and growth. They also share the central assumptions that (1) new inventions are patented, 
giving inventors the right to become the exclusive supplier of the new product (possibly for a 
limited time), which results in monopoly rents, and that (2) there is free entry into the R&D 
sector, which implies that in equilibrium, engaging in R&D does not yield a positive 
expected economic profit. In other words, R&D expenditure at any point in time is 
determined by the expected discounted value of future monopoly rents resulting from 
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innovation. These models predict that if the production sector is growing at a constant rate, 
monopoly rents grow at the same rate. Thus, R&D expenditure should also grow at the same 
rate as the production sector. Note that this is not only true along a balanced growth path, but 
whenever the growth rate of output is stable. It is therefore hard to see how this type of model 
could be consistent with a constant growth rate and at the same time a low but rising R&D 
intensity.5, 6 
In this framework, the driving force behind any R&D investment is the prospect of 
earning monopoly rents from selling the invention in the future, a prospect which is 
guaranteed by a system of patent protection. Innovation is driven by a competitive R&D 
sector comprised of entrepreneurs who want to become a monopolist, either by creating a 
new market or capturing an existing one. 
It has been noted, however, that market leaders are often innovative firms.7 One potential 
motive for firms at the technological frontier to engage in R&D could be that it is optimal to 
make this kind of investment to benefit from lower costs or larger sales in the future. In this 
scenario, R&D expenditures are still closely linked to the appropriable returns from R&D. 
Both in the case of competitive R&D and in the case of innovation by a market leader, 
the protection of monopoly rents by a legal system that effectively enforces patents is crucial. 
Yet, while this assumption is convenient and theoretically appealing, it may not be entirely 
realistic. In their study of the consequences of patents for imitation costs for a small sample 
of American firms, Mansfield et al. (1981)  find that the effectiveness of the patent system in 
                                                
5 The same basic mechanism is at work in more complex models of growth and R&D, such as the model of 
increasing quality and varieties presented in Young (1998) . 
6 There is a possibility that increasing R&D investments are being made in anticipation of future returns that 
have not yet materialized. However, given the length of the period for which data is available this explanation 
seems highly unlikely. 
7 See, for example, Segerstrom (2007) . 
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protecting innovators is less than impressive. While the costs of imitating a product may be 
substantial, they are only increased by 11% if the product was patented for the median 
innovation. Moreover, 60% of patented successful innovations were imitated within four 
years. 
 
Table 1: Effectiveness of alternative means of protecting the comparative advantage 
 Levin et al. (1987) a Cohen et al. (2000) b 
 Processes Products Processes Products 
Patents  
 to prevent duplication 3.52 
(0.06) 
4.33 
(0.07) 23.30 
(0.83) 
34.83 
(0.94) to secure royalty 
income 
3.31 
(0.06) 
3.75 
(0.07) 
Other legal   15.39 (0.63) 
20.71 
(0.73) 
Secrecy 4.31 (0.07) 
3.57 
(0.06) 
50.59 
(1.03) 
51.00 
(0.96) 
Lead time 5.11 (0.05) 
5.41 
(0.05) 
38.43 
(0.96) 
52.75 
(0.92) 
Moving quickly down the learning 
curve 
5.02 
(0.05) 
5.09 
(0.05)   
Sales or service efforts 4.55 (0.07) 
5.59 
(0.05) 
30.73 
(0.88) 
42.74 
(0.91) 
Complementary mfg    
43.00 
(0.95) 
45.61 
(0.88) 
a Range: 1 (not effective at all) to 7 (very effective); average of 650 responses reported; standard errors in 
parentheses 
b Range: effectiveness in percent; average of 1118 (products) and 1087 (processes) responses reported; standard 
errors in parentheses 
Sources: Levin et al. (1987) , table 1, and Cohen et al. (2000) , tables 1 and 2. 
 
If patents are insufficient to protect the return to innovation, firms must look for other means 
of ensuring that they can recover their R&D investment. In a survey of more than 600 firms 
performing R&D, Levin et al. (1987) asked what means of protecting the competitive 
advantage resulting from innovation were most effective. The results of their study, as well as 
a more recent survey by Cohen et al. (2000)  are reported in Table 1. In both studies, patents 
and other legal mechanism get consistently lower ratings than alternative means. Lead time is 
regarded as very effective, at least for product innovations, in both studies. Secrecy gets 
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much higher ratings in the more recent survey, possibly reflecting a change in the importance 
of this instrument since the 1980s. 
The relative effectiveness of lead time, as well as to a certain extent the possible 
importance of secrecy and the need to quickly move down the leaning curve, seem to suggest 
that ongoing innovation at a high enough rate are quite effective in ensuring an innovator’s 
leading position in the market. What is interesting about this conjecture is that if the attempt 
to stay ahead of the competition is an important motive for performing R&D, the scale of 
firms’ R&D investment is not only determined by the return to R&D and thus future market 
size, but also by technological parameters such as the rate and cost of imitation, as well as the 
market structure. It may therefore help to explain why firms have apparently chosen to 
increase their R&D expenditure faster than their revenues could be expected to grow as a 
result. 
The following section presents a model that includes these aspects and shows how the 
appropriability of the returns from innovations may change as R&D becomes an increasingly 
important part of GDP and also firms’ expenditures.    
4 A MODEL 
4.1 Idea 
Our model is built around a production sector in which a fixed number of intermediate goods 
are used to produce final output. The quality of these intermediate goods can be improved 
through R&D, in a similar fashion as in popular Schumpeterian models of quality ladders. 
While intermediate goods are still supplied by only one firm at a time, we assume that there 
is no effective patent protection, so competitors can enter the market at any time if they are 
willing to invest in imitating the current technology in order to be able to offer a competitive 
product. 
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Our key assumption is that the cost getting to the technological frontier increases with 
the rate of innovation that the incumbent chooses. In other words, the current supplier of an 
intermediate good can choose to be more innovative in order to make it harder for other firms 
to enter the market and compete with him.8 
Thus, the rate of innovation and consequently the growth rate is determined by the ease 
of entry into the market for intermediate goods. If this growth rate is higher than what would 
be possible on a balanced growth path, R&D intensity must increase over time to sustain it. 
Such a situation of excessive growth can persist as long as R&D expenditures are small. 
Eventually, as R&D spending gets large enough compared to firms’ revenues, profits drop, 
reducing the incentive for competitors to enter the market. Under this reduced competitive 
pressure, incumbents can eventually lower the rate of innovation, starting a transition towards 
the economy’s balanced growth path. 
In the following subsection, we first develop the model for the case of an uncontested 
monopoly, before introducing competition in 4.3.9 
                                                
8 This notion is related to the concept of pre-emptive patenting due to Gilbert and Newbery (1982) . In contrast 
to their analysis, which is mostly concerned with patenting possible substitutes to prevent market entry by 
competitors, we focus on the possibility to deter entry by innovating at a higher rate to maintain a technological 
advantage over the competition. 
9 In what follows, we will stay as close to the generic quality ladder model (without scale effects) as possible, 
using specifications and notation familiar from the growth literature. While attempting to keep the model 
simple, in introducing competition from potential entrants, we will derive the cost of entry from a plausible 
generalization of a standard R&D production function rather than using an ad-hoc specification. This is mainly 
done to show that our model results from a natural modification of the standard version, and also to convince 
the reader that the new ingredients added here can be derived from broadly accepted assumptions. The resulting 
mathematical complexity is, to the extent possible, hidden in the appendix. 
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4.2 The monopoly case 
Our model is based on a quality ladder framework similar to that of Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) .  
Households maximize the present value U  of the utility they derive from consumption, 
 U = e!"tu(c)dt
0
#
$ , (1) 
where !  is the discount rate and u  is the utility flow as a function of per-capita consumption 
c . Assuming log utility, u(c) = lnc , and free access to capital markets, the solution to the 
households’ optimization problem relates the interest rate r  in the economy to the growth 
rate of consumption in the usual manner, 
 
 
r = !c c + ! . (2) 
Output Y  is produced according to the production function 
 Y = ALY1!! qjX j( )!
j=1
J
" , (3) 
where LY  is the quantity of labour employed in final good production. A large fixed number 
J  of different intermediate goods are used to produce output. The productivity of 
intermediate good j = 1...J  depends on the quantity used Xj  and its quality qj . As usual, 
1!"  stands for the labour share and A  is a positive constant. 
We assume that each intermediate good is supplied by a single firm that possesses the 
technology to convert any quantity of output into the same quantity of the intermediate good 
at no further cost. The solution is standard. At a price of pj , demand for good j  in the 
competitive final goods sector is Xj = !Aqj! pj"1( )
11"! LY . A monopolistic profit-maximizing 
supplier thus chooses to price this good at 1! . In this case, he sells a total of  
 Xj = ! 2Aqj!( )
11"! LY  (4) 
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units and enjoys a profit flow of 
 ! (LY ,qj ) = !LYqj
" 1#" , (5) 
where ! = 1"## #
2A( )11"#  is a positive constant. 
We will start from the assumption that each intermediate good supplier enjoys an 
uncontested monopoly in his market. In such a setting, the monopolist’s motivation to engage 
in R&D results from the fact that a higher product quality qj  results in higher demand and 
thus larger profit flows, as can be seen from equation (5). 
The supplier of intermediate good j  can improve the quality of his product by investing 
in R&D according to the innovation production function 
  !qj = !Lj
"qj# . (6) 
Here, Lj  is the quantity of labour employed in the development quality improvements of 
good j  and ! > 0 , ! "(0,1)  and ! < 1  are constants. The knowledge production function (6) 
is virtually the same as the one used in Jones (1995a) . While the difficulty of achieving a 
given absolute quality improvement may either rise or fall with the current quality qj , ! < 1 
implies that implementing a given relative improvement unambiguously gets harder as qj  
rises. Moreover, ! < 1 makes sure that at any point in time, there are diminishing returns to 
R&D employment. The combined effect of these two factors, 1!"# , will be referred to as the 
burden of knowledge.10 A higher value of this term implies that to maintain a given positive 
rate of quality improvement, R&D employment must rise faster. 
                                                
10 See Jones (2009) for micro-evidence on this burden as well as for a model that provides microfoundations for 
equation (6). 
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As pointed out by Jones (2005, 1995a) , this specification of the innovation function with 
1!"
# > 0  ensures the absence of scale effects, i.e. in the long term the growth rate of the 
economy must be determined by the growth rate of employment rather than its level. 
Firms choose the quality improvement of their product at any point in time to maximize 
the discounted value of their future profit flows net of R&D expenditure, 
 max e!rt " (LY ,qj ) ! wLj( )
0
#
$ dt , (7) 
subject to the knowledge production function (6). The evolution of the interest rate r  and the 
wage rate w , which is the same as in the final goods sector, are beyond the firm’s control. As 
firms are owned by households, the stream of net profit income that results from the 
monopolists’ activity accrues with consumers. 
In equilibrium, all labour L  is employed either in final goods production or R&D,  
 L = LY + Lj
j=1
J
! . (8) 
We assume that the labour force grows at the rate n . 
The following proposition shows the existence and some stability properties of a balanced 
growth path. Here and in what follows, a hat ^ always marks the growth rate of a variable. 
 
Proposition 1 
(i) The economy in which R&D is performed by monopolists has a symmetric balanced 
growth path, along which all sectors grow at the same rate g = n + !1"! qˆ = n + !1"! #1"$ n  
( qˆ j = qˆk ! qˆ  for all sectors j, k) as aggregate output. 
(ii) If the R&D disadvantage from having a better technology grows faster with qj  than 
the profits associated with a better intermediate good, i.e. 1!" > #1!# , a small industry 
starting out at an arbitrary technological level converges to the balanced growth path. 
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(iii) The balanced growth path is stable with respect to deviation of the economy-wide 
productivity level. 
 
Proof: 
See appendix A.1. 
☐ 
 
The idea is simple: For symmetry among industries, the knowledge production 
technology (6) can be aggregated and implies qˆ = !1"# n . The growth rate of output is then 
determined by (3) and (4). It follows from equation (5) that profits grow at the same rate as 
output. R&D spending grows at the rate n + wˆ , where the rate of wage growth wˆ = g ! n  is 
determined by the marginal product of labour (1!" )Y LY  in the final goods sector. Thus, the 
ratio of R&D expenditures to profits remains constant. 
As one would expect, the balanced growth rate depends on the rate of population growth 
and the burden of knowledge. The assumption of a monopolistic market structure does not 
change the growth properties of the model compared to the benchmark model with 
competition in R&D. 
As argued above, the observation of a rising R&D intensity in the US and other countries 
since the 1950s is at odds with the type of balanced growth just described. If this simple 
quality ladder model with monopoly suppliers of intermediate goods is to explain the 
empirical evidence, it must be in the context of a transition path. 
Assume that all intermediate goods producers j = 1...J  are at the same quality level that 
is either higher or lower than the balanced-growth level under the initial population and 
market size. In this case, the dynamics of the model are driven by two differential equations: 
Equation (6) determines how fast intermediate good quality improves in each market, and the 
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first-order condition of (7) with respect to R&D employment Lj  pins down the evolution of 
R&D intensities. Assuming symmetry, the dynamic equations ruling each individual market 
also determine the transition path for the economy as a whole. 
Letting !  be R&D intensity and !  the ratio of current to steady-state product quality, 
the dynamic system that characterizes the transition path of the economy can be written as 
 
 
!!
! = "#1 +#2!
$"1%&  (9) 
 
 
!!
! = "3 # "4$
%#1!&#1  (10) 
for constants !i > 0 , i = 1...4  as long as the R&D sector is small (see appendix A.1). This 
dynamic system is saddle-path stable, with a downward sloping transition path in the (!,")  
space, as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Transition dynamics in the monopoly case 
 
 
For the economy to experience a rise in R&D intensity during the transition to the balanced 
growth path, it has to start out with a higher stock of knowledge about the production of 
intermediate goods than in the long-term equilibrium. As it approaches the steady state, 
!  
!  
 !! = 0  
 
 !! = 0  
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growth rates increase. Since the data suggest that per-capita growth rates have been rather 
stable or even declining over the past decades, the transitional dynamics implied by this 
model do not seem to provide a convincing explanation for the increase in R&D spending. 
Moreover, it is not obvious why the current stock of knowledge should be above its steady-
state value. 
4.3 The Possibility of Entry 
4.3.1 The Strategy of the Incumbent 
Now assume that competitors can enter the market with equivalent products if they spend an 
amount C(z)>0 to acquire the necessary technical knowledge using an imitation approach, 
where z is a variable controlled by the incumbent that affects the difficulty of catching up. 
Assume that increasing z raises a competitors costs, C '(z) > 0 , but that it also reduces the 
incumbent’s profit flow and thus its present value of monopoly profits V(z), i.e. V '(z) < 0 . 
Entrants cannot surpass the incumbent’s technological level by imitating. Once they 
catch up, they have to enter the market and use the same process of innovation at the same 
cost as the incumbent. At this point, price competition would drive firm profits down and the 
best choice for the two firms is to merge. Assume that in this case, the owner of the entrant 
firm acquires a share ! "(0,1)  of the merged firm. Given the symmetry between incumbent 
and entrant, ! = 12  is a plausible value. 
If it is optimal to deter entry, the incumbent has to chose z such that !V (z) "C(z) , i.e. a 
possible entrant’s share of the (optimal) value of the monopoly supplier is worth no more 
than the cost of getting into the market and acquiring this share. 
As long as the incumbent does not deter other firms from entering the market, entry will 
happen repeatedly, each time driving down the share of the original shareholders in the 
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operation, so that their claims to profit flows approach zero. As deterring entry yields a 
positive discounted present value of profits ! "1C(z) , allowing entry cannot be optimal. 
In the following, we will model a scenario in which the incumbent’s strategy variable z is 
the rate of technological progress. 
4.3.2 Choosing the Rate of Innovation 
Assume that the entrant can acquire the necessary knowledge using a technology similar to 
the leader’s R&D innovation production function (6), 
  !
"qj = ! !Lj
!" !qj
!#e$%age( !qj ) . (11) 
A tilde ~ marks variables and constants referring to the entrant’s imitation technology. Apart 
from potential differences in the values of the constants, equation (11) differs from (6) in 
including the term  e!"age( !qj ) , where !  is a positive constant and age(q)  stands for the time 
that has passed since the quality level q  was first introduced by the incumbent. It captures 
the effect that older technologies that have been available for a longer time can be understood 
and replicated more easily, which is a form of intra-industry knowledge spillovers. 
Even though we will refer the entrant’s accumulation of technological knowledge as 
imitation, it should not be interpreted as pure mindless copying of existing technologies. 
According to the survey by Levin et al. (1987) , the single most effective way of learning 
about new processes and products of competitors is independent R&D.11 Equation (11) 
simply states that it is easier to follow in somebody’s footsteps than to blaze a trail. Any firm 
that wants to challenge the monopolist’s position will eventually have to innovate once it 
reaches the incumbent’s technological level. 
We assume that initially, potential entrants have negligible knowledge of the technology 
employed by the incumbent. Even so, the fact that old technologies can be replicated much 
                                                
11 Ibid., p. 806, table 6. 
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more easily allows an entrant to acquire the skills necessary to produce a good of the same 
quality as the incumbent at finite costs in finite time. In this case, the cost of entry is a 
function of the incumbent’s technology level, his rate of innovation, and the overall wage. 
 
Lemma 1 
Consider the case where that the growth rate of the economy is close to constant, and that the 
initial technological knowledge of an entrant approaches zero. Then, the lower bound of the 
cost C  of matching an incumbent’s technology qj  can be written as 
 
 
C = ! 1" !# + $qˆ j
%
&'
(
)*
" 1!+
qj
1" !#
!+ w , (12) 
where w  is the wage rate at the time technological parity is reached, qˆ j  is the growth rate of 
the incumbent’s technology and !  is a positive constant. 
Proof: 
See appendix A.2. 
☐ 
  
The incumbent can directly affect the entrant’s cost at any point in time by changing the 
rate of innovation qˆ j . A higher rate of quality growth means that any previous technology 
has been available and known for a shorter period of time, which according to (11) makes it 
harder to imitate. Thus, choosing a higher qˆ j  leads to a higher relative cost increase for the 
entrant than for the incumbent. 
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In order to retain his monopoly12, the incumbent must choose the optimal R&D intensity 
according to (7) subject to the additional constraint 
 V ! e"rt # (LY ,qj )"wLj( )
0
$
% dt &' "1C . (13) 
If imitation costs are high and grow at least at the growth rate of the profit flow so that this 
constraint never binds, the monopolist behaves exactly like in the unconstrained situation 
described above. 
If, however, the parameters of the model are such that constraint (13) binds at any point 
in time, the incumbent’s R&D expenditure is driven not only by future profits, but also by the 
R&D costs of potential competitors. This case occurs if imitation costs rise more slowly with 
the level of technology than innovation costs, 
 
1! !"
!#
< 1!"# .
13 Note that according to (12), if wˆ  
and qˆ j  are constant, the cost of entering the market grows at the rate  
1! !"
!#
qˆ j + wˆ . In this case, 
equation (6) implies that the incumbent’s R&D expenditures grow at the rate 1!"# qˆ j + wˆ . It 
therefore becomes cheaper and cheaper over time to enter the market. 
Analyzing the balanced growth path of this model is not particularly interesting. As in all 
semi-endogenous growth models of this type, growth is eventually constained by population 
growth and the burden of knowledge. A balanced growth path along which the market-entry 
constraint (13) does not bind is identical to the path described in proposition 1. If  (13) is 
binding, as will be seen below, the resulting balanced growth path is characterized by the 
same growth rates of all variables, but a higher level of technology, resulting in higher R&D 
costs and zero profits of incumbents, making entry unattractive. 
                                                
12 Equation (13) implements the simple entry game described above. Alternative assumptions are possible, but 
as long as entry is triggered by the ratio between the monopolist’s (potential) net profits and the costs of entry, 
our results remain the same. 
13 It does not seem implausible that it is harder to accelerate R&D with additional resources than imitation. 
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In what follows, we will characterize the growth dynamics of an economy in which the 
market entry constraint is binding. In such a scenario, it is possible to observe rising R&D 
shares in the presence of stable aggregate growth. However, as R&D shares must eventually 
stabilize, the growth rate of the economy must change over time. To analyze the growth 
properties of the economy along such a path, which is characterized by time-varying growth 
rates and convergence towards a balanced growth path, without getting caught up in inter-
industry short-term dynamics, we introduce the concept of a medium-term growth path. 
  
Definition 
The economy is said to follow a medium-term growth path (MTGP14) starting at time s if (i) 
all industries are at the same technological level at s and (ii) the market entry constraint (13) 
is binding for any time t ! s . 
  
Requirement (i) makes sure that the model works as if there were only one intermediate good 
industry. This makes it possible to abstract from the effects of individual industries 
converging to the general productivity level. Note, however, that this definition does not 
necessarily identify a unique growth path for the economy, as initial conditions affect the 
shape of the MTGP. Requirement (ii) lets us focus on the part of an economy’s growth 
experience for which R&D investment is driven by potential competition in each industry. 
  
Proposition 2 
                                                
14 The term “medium-term growth path” was chosen to emphasize that observed growth rates may be different 
form the growth rates possible in the (very) long run, while at the same time short-term adjustments like the 
convergence of individual industries to the economy-wide productivity level are ignored. 
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A MTGP along which monopolists are choosing R&D effort to prevent entry has the 
following properties: 
(i) It is characterized by a transition from high growth to low growth, 
 
lim
t!"#
$ t =
!%
1" !& n > %1"& n = limt!#$ t , where ! t  is the rate of GDP growth at time t. 
(ii) If 
 
! 1"#$ + (1" !) 1"
!#
!$
> %1"% , a small industry locally converges to the MTGP technology 
level of the rest of the economy. !  is the ratio of the current R&D share to its long-
term level. 
Proof: 
See appendix A.3. 
☐ 
  
Proposition 2 (i) is the analogue of the same part of proposition 1 for the case of possible 
entry. The growth rate of the economy drops from a high level that is determined by the ease 
of imitation to a lower level that is consistent with a constant R&D share. This long-term 
growth rate is the same that would result under alternative assumptions regarding market 
structure in the R&D sector on a balanced growth path. Part (ii) of proposition 2, which 
corresponds to proposition 1 (ii), shows that individual industries are more likely to converge 
to the general productivity level at a later point in time when the R&D share is higher. Note 
that there is no stability result corresponding to proposition 1 (iii), as different initial 
condition with regards to the general productivity level simply characterize different MTGPs. 
In a MTGP setting, the monopolist’s only control variables are the price of the 
intermediate good and R&D spending. The price is pinned down by the solution to the static 
profit maximization problem. While clearly reducing profits, adjusting the price does not 
deter entry, as other firms are attracted by the maximum net profit they could earn rather than 
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the current monopolist’s actual profit flow. Thus, the only way for the monopolist to 
discourage entry is to adjust R&D spending. 
Increased R&D spending has two effects. First, it reduces the monopolist’s net profit 
flow, making entry less attractive. Assuming that the growth rate of technology qˆ  is constant 
over time and that the share of labour employed in the R&D sector is very small, so that LY  
grows approximately at the rate of population growth even if R&D employment 
LR&D = Ljj=1
J!  grows at a higher rate, the present value of the net profit flow t  periods in 
the future, NP(t)  can be written as 
 NP(t) = e!rt "LYqj
# 1!# ! wLj( ) = "LY ,0qj ,0e(n+# 1!# qˆ! r )t ! w0Lj ,0e(wˆ+1!$ % qˆ! r )t , 
where a subscript 0 denotes the current value of this variable and wˆ  is the growth rate of 
wages. Remember that equation (6) implies that R&D employment must rise at the rate 
1!"
# qˆ . If qˆ  is above the (sustainable) unconstrained optimum, R&D intensity rises over time. 
If the R&D sector is small enough, however, per-capita consumption still grows at 
approximately the same rate ! 1"! qˆ  as productivity in the final goods sector, so we can use 
equation (2) to rewrite NP(t)  as 
 
NP(t) = !LY ,0qj ,0e(n+
" 1#" qˆ#(" 1#" qˆ+$ ))t # w0Lj ,0e(
" 1#" qˆ+1#% & qˆ#(" 1#" qˆ+$ ))t
= !LY ,0qj ,0e(n#$ )t # w0Lj ,0e(
1#%
& qˆ#$ )t
. (14) 
Thus, a change of the growth rate affects the present value of the net profit flow only through 
the increase in R&D expenditure, not through the effect on future rents earned in the market 
for intermediate goods. 
The second effect of higher R&D expenditures is that they increase the growth rate of 
intermediate good quality, qˆ , which, according to equation (12), makes it more costly for 
another firm to replicate the current technology and enter the market. 
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As long as total R&D spending is very low compared to the monopolist’s profit flow, 
this second effect is quantitatively more important.15 In this case, the rate of innovation and 
consequently the growth rate are mainly determined by equation (12), and thus by the 
incumbent’s effort to improve product quality at a rate that is high enough to make it too 
costly for competitors to enter the market. 
A situation like this can persist as long as the R&D sector is small compared to the rest 
of the economy. As R&D employment is growing faster than the labour force in order to 
maintain a high rate of innovation, R&D expenditure eventually becomes a relevant cost 
factor and net profits as a share of total GDP begin to drop. This effect reduces competitors’ 
incentive to enter the intermediate goods market, thus allowing the incumbent to reduce the 
rate of innovation. Asymptotically, R&D intensity stabilizes, monopoly rents net of R&D 
expenditures drop, and the economy converges to a balanced growth path characterized by 
the same growth rate g  as in the uncontested monopoly case. If the initial R&D intensity is 
low enough, these medium-term dynamics can persist for a very long time, even if the growth 
rated during this period are substantially above the level that is sustainable in the long term. 
5 TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS 
5.1 Calibrating the Model 
As mentioned above, Jones (2002)  argues that the bulk of US growth is due to this sort of 
transitional dynamics. In a growth accounting exercise he attributes about half of the 2% 
annual per capital GDP growth in the US to rising R&D intensity, 30% to improved human 
capital, and only 20% (i.e. about 0.4% of growth per annum) to sustainable steady state 
                                                
15 Equation (14) seems to suggest that even for a low initial level of R&D expenditures, the R&D cost effect of 
increasing quality growth can be large. Remember, however, that this equation is an approximation that is only 
valid as long as (a) the R&D sector is small and (b) qˆ  is constant. Since the intermediate goods supplier can 
leave the market at any time, the present value net profits can never be negative. 
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growth.16 Our model is able to explain why R&D effort might be rising faster than GDP, and 
can also be used to predict when and how this growth episode must end.  
The following calibrations are based on the idea that the evolution of the growth rate of 
an economy can be fully determined by the observation of the R&D share and growth rate at 
one point in time: The two state variables of the model are productivity and population. If the 
growth rate is always above its long-term level, the R&D share is growing monotonically, so 
there is a bijection between the R&D share and L. Once L is known, the other state can be 
obtained from equation (6) using the current growth rate. It is thus possible to obtain the 
current state of the economy without having to calibrate level variables like q or L. However, 
the values of several important model parameters must still be determined. 
According to data provided by the National Science Foundation, the ratio of non-federal 
R&D spending to GDP has risen from 0.63% in 1953 to 1.95% in 2007. While this 
corresponds to a substantial rise of the R&D share of 2.1% per year, total R&D expenditures 
as a share of GDP are still quite small. Since our model predicts a profit share in GDP of 
! (1"! ) , which for a capital share of ! = 13  works out to about 22%, the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to profits is still low enough make the simplifying assumption that net profits 
NP  have grown at the same rate as GDP a reasonable approximation. 
We can write the growth rate of the share of R&D expenditures in GDP as  
 
 ˆ
s = wLR&D( )! ! Yˆ = wˆ + 1!"# qˆ( )! $1!$ qˆ + n( ) = 1!"# qˆ ! n . (15) 
If we assume that  1! !"  is small compared to ! qˆ , which is not unreasonable considering that 
plausible values of  
!!  lie between -1 and 1 and that the rate !  at which innovations become 
easier to imitate is likely to be much higher than the growth rate, we can write the growth rate 
of imitation cost compared to GDP approximately as 
                                                
16 Ibid., p 228, table 2, ! = 0.33  case. 
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iˆ = Cˆ ! Yˆ " ˆˆq!# +
1! !$
!#
qˆ + wˆ
%
&
'
(
)
* !
+
1!+ qˆ + n( ) =
ˆˆq
!#
+
1! !$
!#
qˆ ! n . (16) 
If monopolists are deterring entry by setting the growth rate of the product quality 
accordingly, entry costs C  are growing at the same rate as net profits and GDP, so iˆ  is zero. 
Relating the rate of quality growth to the growth rate of productivity ! , qˆ = 1!" " # , we can 
rewrite equations (15) and (16) as 
 sˆ = 1!"# 1!$$ % ! n  (17) 
 
 ˆ
s = ! "ˆ!# +
1!$
$ "
1!%
# !
1! !%
!#( ) . (18) 
These equations determine the R&D burdens of innovators and imitators, 1!"#  and  
1! !"
!#
, as 
functions of observable variables, if we are able to find a value for  
!ˆ
!" . Since the change of 
the per-capita growth rate has been close to zero since the 1950s, for this term to play an 
important role in equation (18),  !!  would have to be very small. We will thus assume that 
 
!ˆ
!" = 0 . Setting ! = 13 , and using the US post-war averages of R&D intensity growth, per-
capita output growth, and labour force growth, sˆ = 2.1% , ! = 2% , and n = 1.7% , we find 
that 1!"# = 0.95 $ 1 and  
1! !"
!#
= 0.425 $ 0.4 . It is therefore significantly easier to speed up the 
imitation process compared to increasing the rate of R&D output. Allowing for a negative  
!ˆ
!"  
would lead to a somewhat higher value of 
 
1! !"
!#
. 
These crude calculations suggest that cost of innovating has grown roughly in proportion 
to the quality of intermediate goods, while the cost of imitation has grown at less than half 
this rate. Recasting this result in terms of the revenue stream earned from innovation, whose 
value is proportional to q! 1"!  (see equation (5)), the cost of imitation has grown at the 80% of 
the rate of profit growth, while the cost of innovating has grown twice as fast, which is 
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equivalent to saying that R&D employment must have grown twice as fast as per-capita 
GDP. 
So, according to these values, while the cost of imitating an idea of a given value is about 
20% lower today than in 1955, the cost of originally inventing the final 1% of it has grown by 
a factor of about 2.8. 
5.2 The Growth Path 
Based on the calibrations of 1!"#  and  
1! !"
!#
 obtained above, we now investigate the properties of 
the resulting growth path numerically. This path is determined by the requirement that at any 
point in time the growth rate of all discounted future rents in the market for intermediate 
goods be the same as the growth rate of the minimal imitation cost, taking into account the 
time-variable interest rate as defined in (2) and the fact that resources spent on intermediate 
goods and R&D are not available for consumption. Initial conditions regarding R&D 
intensity and GDP growth then fully determine the future growth path for a given set of 
model parameters. To avoid having to calibrate the parameters !  and  
!!  that determine the 
growth rate of imitation costs in equation (12), we continue to assume  1! !" "
#
qˆ j , so that 
cost of entering the market for an intermediate good grows at the rate 
 
1
!!
ˆˆq + 1" !#!! qˆ j + wˆ . 
The numerical simulations are based on a discrete-time version of the model with a 
period length of one year. Details can be found in appendix A.4. 
Table 2 lists the parameters that need to be calibrated. Most of the choices are pretty 
straightforward: Values of 1!"#  and  
1! !"
!#
 that match US data were determined in the previous 
subsection; labour force growth is assigned the US post-war average of 1.7% per year; the 
discount rate and the labour share are set to the values most commonly used in the literature. 
The only parameter for which we cannot easily obtain a value is the elasticity of imitation 
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output with respect to labour input,  !! . We therefore use three values within the admissible 
interval of (0,1) ,  !! "{14 , 12 , 3 4} . 
 
Table 2: Calibration 
Parameter Value 
!  discount rate 4% p.a. 
!  capital share 13  
1!"
#  burden of knowledge: innovator 1 
 
1! !"
!#
 burden of knowledge: imitator 0.4 
n  population growth 1.7% p.a. 
 !!  elasticity of imitation output w.r.t. labour 
14 , 12 , 3 4  
 
Table 3: Transition paths 
  
!! = 14   
!! = 12   
!! = 3 4  
Per-capita growth rate 
t = 0  2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 
t = 50  1.96% 1.93% 1.91% 
t = 100  1.83% 1.76% 1.72% 
t = 200  0.94% 1.10% 1.12% 
t = !  0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 
t(1.425)  166 years 155 years 149 years 
R&D intensity (ratio to extrapolated trend in parentheses) 
t = 0  0.60% (100%) 0.60% (100%) 0.60% (100%) 
t = 50  1.80% (98.3%) 1.79% (97.3%) 1.77% (96.7%) 
t = 100  5.01% (89.3%) 4.75% (84.5%) 4.58% (81.5%) 
t = 200  17.8% (33.8%) 15.2% (28.9%) 13.8% (26.3%) 
t = !  18.2% (0%) 18.2% (0%) 18.2% (0%) 
t(ratio = 12)  177 years 163 years 156 years 
Present value of net profit as share of GDP 
t = 0  9.06 9.12 9.15 
t = 50  7.76 7.94 8.03 
t = 100  5.38 5.86 6.12 
t = 200  0.23 1.33 1.95 
t = !  0 0 0 
t(4.83)  109 years 120 years 127 years 
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Table 3 presents some characteristics of the growth path that is determined by an initial 
annual growth rate of per-capita GDP of 2% and an initial R&D intensity of 0.6%, roughly 
corresponding to the respective values for the US economy in 1950. The period length is one 
year. For the three different levels of  !!  under consideration, the table shows the values of the 
growth rate, R&D intensity, and the ratio of profits to GDP at five points in time, as well as a 
measure of the half-life of the deviation of each variable from its long-term value. 
 
Figure 5: Transition dynamics 
  
 
 
 
Generally, for lower  !! , growth rates remain high for a longer time and R&D intensities grow 
faster. This is because for a low  !! , a given reduction of the growth rate of technology ceteris 
paribus has a bigger impact on the amount of labour required to catch up to the technological 
leader, thus having a larger effect on imitation costs. At the same time, having a high growth 
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rate for a longer time means that R&D expenditures grow faster, consequently exhausting the 
monopolists’ profits sooner. Eventually, the economy therefore approaches its balanced 
growth path sooner for lower  !! . 
The trajectories of the growth rate, R&D intensity, and profits are shown in Figure 5 for 
the intermediate case of  
!! = 12  over a time span of 400 years, starting in period !80  (as 
above, period 0 is calibrated to resemble 1950). Where relevant, the evolution of the 
corresponding variable along the balanced growth path (BGP) and the constant growth path17 
(CGP) along which the original growth rate is maintained are also plotted.  
What is interesting about this scenario is the fact that our model is able to generate a 
growth rate above the balanced growth path level that is maintained almost unchanged for a 
long period of time. In fact, per-capita GDP growth remains remarkably close to 2% 
(between 1.97% and 2.02%) for 130 years, which is in line with the US growth experience 
since the late 19th century.18 This era, closely resembling a constant growth path as described 
in Jones (2002)  is followed by a relatively pronounced transition period. 80% of the drop of 
the growth rate takes place between periods 80 and 220. After that, the economy follows the 
balanced growth path. 
6 WELFARE AND POLICY 
A full investigation of welfare implications and optimal policy in the context of our model 
are beyond the scope of this paper. However, a few brief remarks are in place. 
                                                
17 See Jones (2002) . 
18 This scenario assumes that entry has always been a threat for the whole time span under consideration. Since 
the burden of knowledge grows faster for innovators than imitators, it is possible that before some point in the 
past, the optimal rate of innovation chosen by an unconstrained monopolist was high enough to prevent entry. In 
this case, before this specific point in time, the R&D share would be constant, resulting in a lower rate of growth 
before the threat of competition raises growth. 
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First of all, since an unconstrained monopolist internalizes the full cost of R&D but only 
the part of the social return he can appropriate, R&D effort is too low if there is no threat of 
entry.  
With entry in the long run, on the other hand, once the economy is on the balanced 
growth path, the allocation is remarkably similar to what would result in a model of creative 
destruction with a competitive R&D sector, in the sense that the present value of monopoly 
rents and the present value of R&D expenditures are the same. The result that whether there 
is too much or too little R&D in this case depends on parameters formally carries over to this 
case. Note, however, that the interpretation of R&D expenditure may be somewhat different 
in our case. While one factor leading to inefficiencies in the decentralised economies with 
competitive R&D sectors results from the duplication of efforts, in our model where 
innovation is still coordinated by a monopolist, this reason for inefficiency would likely not 
arise. However, as our specification assumed diminishing returns to R&D employment, a 
similar source of wasteful overinvestment in innovation still exists. 
As the economy moves towards the balanced growth path, increasing R&D intensity, at 
least initially it gets closer to the amount of R&D investment a social planner would choose. 
As we have seen in the previous subsection, however, the transition may take a very long 
time. 
Close to the balanced growth path, when R&D spending is essentially determined by 
future rents, taxes or subsidies have the usual effect on innovation. Remember though that on 
the initial constant growth path, the rate of innovation is driven by the ease of entry. 
Subsidizing the market leader’s R&D is likely to mostly result in somewhat higher profit 
flows. To effectively influence the incumbent’s behaviour, it would be necessary to affect the 
cost of entry, for example by subsidizing R&D expenditures of imitators or using other 
means of encouraging competition. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper was to provide an explanation of the observation that, while per 
capita growth has been quite stable for a long time in the US and other comparable countries, 
R&D intensity has grown over time.  
We have shown that a model in which monopoly suppliers can more easily maintain 
their market position if they innovate at a higher rate is capable of generating the dynamics 
we observe. Moreover, the model has the interesting feature that an unsustainably high 
growth rate accompanied by a rising R&D intensity can persist for a long time, resembling 
the constant growth path described by Jones (2002) . Eventually, however, the economy must 
embark on a transition towards a balance growth path. This transition is driven by falling 
profits of R&D intensive firms. 
We have chosen our model to be as similar as possible to the generic quality ladder 
model, and we have introduced extensions to or modifications of the standard framework in a 
simple and stylized way. Presumably, the basic mechanisms at work would carry over to a 
more complex and realistic specifications. 
For a model like this to better match the data, it would for example be desirable to 
choose a production function that disentangles the demand elasticity that monopolists are 
facing from the labour share. This would make it possible to calibrate monopoly rents 
independently, which is important as it is the amount of these rents what eventually drives the 
transition to the balanced growth path. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that 
the share of monopoly rents in GDP of over 20% and the resulting firm value along the initial 
constant growth path are somewhat too high. 
Moreover, the result that each market is served by a monopolist who retains his position 
indeterminately is unrealistic. However, it should not be too difficult to make modifications 
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that allow for more general and realistic market structures.19 In a setting, for example, where 
a market leader engages in Cournot competition with followers, the market share and thus the 
oligopoly rents of the leader are still sensitive to his technological advantage, giving him an 
incentive to innovate at a rate fast enough to stay ahead.20 In addition to this, one could allow 
for stochastic R&D outcomes, introducing the possibility of the technological leader being 
replaced in the case of a bad realization. 
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APPENDIX 
A.1 The Uncontested Monopoly Case 
Setting up the Hamiltoninan corresponding to the firm’s optimization problem (objective (7) 
subject to (6)) yields – after elimination of the co-state and some further manipulation – the 
following two equations that determine the monopolist’s behaviour: 
 (1! ")Lˆ j = r ! wˆ ! #"
$
1!$ % w
!1Lj"!1qj
&!1+ $1!$ LY
'
(
)
*
+
,  (19) 
 qˆ j = !Lj"q#$1  (20) 
If there is a symmetric balanced growth path, equation (20) (which is the same as (6)) implies 
 qˆ j =
!
1"# n . (21) 
Then, we have from (4) that Xˆ j = n + !1"! #1"$ n , which can be used in the production function 
(3) to get 
 Yˆ = n + !1"!
#
1"$ n . (22) 
As the capital inputs grow at the same rate as output, employment in the production of each 
variety grows at the rate n ,  
 Lˆ j = n , (23) 
and so does R&D employment. The growth rate of per-capita consumption is therefore 
constant: 
 cˆ = Yˆ ! Lˆ = "1!"
#
1!$ n  (24) 
Using this in (2) determines the interest rate 
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 r = !1"!
#
1"$ n + % . (25) 
Finally, wages are pinned down by the marginal product of labour in production, 
w = (1!" )Y LY , so 
 wˆ = !1"!
#
1"$ n . (26) 
For firm behaviour to be consistent with this balanced growth path, the term in square 
brackets on the right hand side of (19) must be constant; only then is a constant growth rate 
of Lj  possible. Using equations (26), (23) and (21), it is easily verified that this is indeed the 
case on the balanced growth path. 
To see whether a single small intermediate goods industry converges to the balanced 
growth path, along which the rest of the economy is already moving, define the variables !  
and !  by Lj = !L  and qj = !q , where q = qk , k ! j , is the quality level in all other 
industries. Using these definitions in (19) and (20) yields the dynamic system 
 !ˆ = "#4 +#5$
%!&"1  (27) 
 !ˆ = "6 # "7!
$#1%
&#1+ '1#'  (28) 
for positive constants !i , i = 4...7  as long as !1"# > n . For 1!" > #1!# , this system is 
qualitatively the same as the saddle-path stable system shown in Figure 4. 
To show that the economy converges to a balanced growth path when all monopolists 
start out at the same quality level above or below the balanced-growth value, the same basic 
approach as for the single-industry case above can be used. The main difference is that now 
wage growth changes along the transition path, w = (1!" )Y LY , which must be taken into 
account when rewriting equation (19) in terms of variables !  and !  to get (9) and (10). 
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A.2 The Case of Possible Entry 
To determine the optimal cost an imitator must incur in order to catch up to the technological 
level of the incumbent, we proceed in three steps: First, we derive the optimal path of R&D 
employment during the catch-up process solving the firm’s dynamic problem. Second, we 
determine the trajectory of technological knowledge that results from an efficient 
employment path. Finally, we solve the static problem of finding the right level of R&D 
employment, which is the same as solving for the optimal duration of the catch-up period. In 
doing all this, we will assume a constant rate of innovation by the incumbent, qˆ j , as well as 
symmetry between industries, qˆi = qˆk =: qˆ  ( i,k !{1...J} ) and cˆ ! wˆ .21 
Before we begin, it is helpful to eliminate the function age  from equation (11). Noting 
that for a constant rate of technological progress qˆ , we have !qj exp qˆ !age( !qj )( ) = qj , so that 
we can rewrite (11) as 
  !
"qj = ! !Lj
!" !qj
!#$% qˆ q j
% #q . (29) 
Step 1: 
The entrant has to invest in R&D for a time T  in order to catch up to the leader at t = 0 . To 
do so efficiently, he solves the dynamic problem 
 
 
min
!Lj
e!rt !Lj (t)w(t)dt
!T
0
"  (30) 
subject to (29). From the first-order conditions of the Hamiltonian we get, after eliminating 
the co-state and solving for employment,   
 
 
!ˆLj =
! + r " wˆ
1" !# =
! + $
1" !# . (31) 
                                                
21 While these assumptions strictly speaking only hold along a balanced growth path, any changes in the 
relevant variables along a transition path happen slowly enough for these conditions to be fulfilled almost 
exactly at a horizon of years or even decades. 
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Step 2: 
With a constant growth rate of R&D employment and the incumbent’s technology, we can 
rewrite equation (29) as 
 
 
!"qj = ! !Lj ,0
!" qj ,0
# #q !qj
!$%# qˆ exp ( !" #+&1% !" +
#
qˆ qˆ)t( ) , (32) 
where an subscript 0 is used to mark the value of variables at time t = 0  when the entrant 
reaches the technological level of the incumbent and is ready to compete. 
(32) is a Bernoulli equation. Writing it as  !
"qj = !1 !qj!2 e!3t  for constants !i , i = 1,2,3 , it is 
easily verified that  
 
 
!qj (t) = (1! "2 )
"1
"3
e"3t ! e"3 0( ) + !qj ,01!"2#
$
%
&
'
(
1
1!"2
 (33) 
is a solution. To find out how long it takes to catch up, we determine the point in time !T  
when the imitator’s technological knowledge is zero,  !qj (!T ) = 0 . Using (33) and solving for 
the variable of interest, we obtain 
 
 
!T = 1
"3
ln 1! !qj ,01!"2
"3
"1(1! "2 )
#
$%
&
'(
. (34) 
Note that admissible values of the constants !i  are such that the argument of the logarithm is 
between zero and one, leading to a (weakly) positive, possibly infinite duration of the catch-
up process. 
Step 3: 
We still need to determine the duration of the catch-up process or, alternatively, the level of 
employment  
!Lj ,0 . To do so, we minimize the firms R&D expenditure 
 
 
min
!Lj ,0
w0 !Lj ,0 exp (wˆ +
! + "
1# !$ # r)t
%
&'
(
)*
dt
#T
0
+ , (35) 
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where !T  is determined by (34). Filling in the proper parameters for !i  and using 
 
!qj ,0 = qj ,0 , we can derive 
 
 
!T = !" # + $1! !" +#
%
&'
(
)*
!1
ln 1! !Lj ,0!
!" !qj ,01!
!+
!" #+$1! !" +#
!, 1! !+ + #qˆ( )
%
&
''
(
)
**
. (36) 
Remember that the argument of the logarithm must not be negative, so we also have the 
constraint 
 
 
!Lj ,0 ! !qj ,01"
!#
!$ %+&1" !$ +%
!' 1" !# + %qˆ( )
(
)
*
*
+
,
-
-
1
!$
. (37) 
Solving the integral in (35), using (36) and simplifying as much as possible, we arrive at 
 
 
min
!Lj ,0
w0 !Lj ,01!
!"qj ,01!
!# !$(1! !# + %qˆ )
&
'(
)
*+
!1
. (38) 
This shows that the objective function is monotonically decreasing in  
!Lj ,0 . Thus using the 
lowest admissible value for this variable as given by (37), we finally arrive at the infimum 
amount of imitation costs (12). 
This optimal cost is achieved only for an infinite duration of the catch-up process. 
However, due to the properties of (36) for values of the argument of ln  close to zero, very 
small increases of the cost above its infimum can buy substantial reductions of the (finite) 
R&D duration. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) For t!" , the growth rate !  of the economy cannot be higher than the growth rate 
on a balanced growth path, !1"# n , because the R&D share would grow without 
bounds. It cannot be lower either, because then net profits would eventually grow at 
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the rate ! , while the cost of imitation grows at a lower rate, making market entry 
possible at some point in time. 
For t! "# , the growth rate is given by the equality between the present value of 
monopoly profits (R&D costs are not relevant yet, LY=L) and entry costs: 
 
e!rs"
t
#
$ LYqj% 1!%ds = 2& 1! !' + (qˆ( )!
1
!) qj
1! !'
!) w  
Using equation (2),  w ! q
!
1"! , the fact that consumption grows at the same rate as 
GDP, and substituting !  for constants, we get 
 
LY = !
qj
1" !#
!$
1" !# + %qˆ( )
1
!$
. 
At any point in time, there is a level of qj such that qˆ  is constant. In this case, qj must 
grow at the rate 
 
!
!
1" "# n . It is easy to show that qj converges to this level. 
Assume that the productivity in industry j, qj, is changed by a factor ! . Then, if everything 
else stays the same, monopoly profits change by a factor of !
!
1"!  at any point in time, R&D 
costs change by !
1"#
$ , and entry costs by !
1" !!
!" . The ratio of net profits to entry costs, which is 
unity along the MTGP, is thus  ! = "
#
1$# $
1$ !%
!& $ '"
1$%
& $
1$ !%
!& , where !  is the ratio of R&D costs to 
monopoly rents. For the industry to locally converge to the productivity level of the 
economy, !  needs to drop when qj rises, resulting in a reduced future growth of productivity 
in this industry. We thus have 
 
d!
d" "=1
< 0# $1%$ < &
1%'
(
+ (1% &)1%
!'
!(
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A.4 The Solution Algorithm 
The model is solved for periods t = 0...T . For t > T , all variables are assumed to be at their 
asymptotic balanced growth path levels. The solution algorithm for this perfect-foresight 
model can be described as follows: 
(i) guess qˆ  for periods t = 0...T ;  
(ii) for each of these periods, find  
a. an index of output resulting from qˆ , 
b. R&D intensity, using the initial value for period 0 and the R&D technology (6), 
c. net profits as a share of GDP, using R&D intensity, 
d. the interest rate according to (2), resulting from consumption growth (i.e. the 
growth of output net of R&D expenditure), 
e. discounted future profits, using period profits and interest rates for all future 
periods, 
f. imitation costs, using the fact that they are proportional to discounted future 
profits in the first period (because (13) is binding) and grow at a rate 
 
1
!!
ˆˆq + 1" !#!! qˆ j + wˆ  thereafter; 
(iii) check whether the ratio of imitation costs to discounted future profits is the same for 
every period; if this is the case qˆ  was chosen such that (13) is binding every period and 
we are done; if not, update the guess of qˆ  and start over with (ii). 
